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ISSUES AND OPINIONS
GENERALIZATION AND INDUCTION:  MISCONCEPTIONS,
CLARIFICATIONS, AND A CLASSIFICATION OF INDUCTION1
Eric W. K. Tsang
School of Management, University of Texas at Dallas, 800 W. Campbell Road,
Richardson, TX  75083-0688  U.S.A.  {ewktsang@utdallas.edu}
John N. Williams
School of Social Sciences, Singapore Management University, 90 Stamford Road,
Singapore  178903  SINGAPORE  {johnwilliams@smu.edu.sg}
In “Generalizing Generalizability in Information Systems Research,” Lee and Baskerville (2003) try to clarify
generalization and classify it into four types.  Unfortunately, their account is problematic.  We propose repairs. 
Central among these is our balance-of-evidence argument that we should adopt the view that Hume’s problem
of induction has a solution, even if we do not know what it is.  We build upon this by proposing an alternative
classification of induction.  There are five types of generalization:  (1) theoretical, (2) within-population,
(3) cross-population, (4) contextual, and (5) temporal, with theoretical generalization being across the
empirical and theoretical levels and the rest within the empirical level.  Our classification also includes two
kinds of inductive reasoning that do not belong to the domain of generalization.  We then discuss the
implications of our classification for information systems research.
Keywords:  Research methodology, generalization, generalizability, induction, deduction, statistical
generalization, statistical syllogism, inductive analogy, Hume’s problem of induction
Introduction1
Induction is essential for any substantial scientific endeavor.
Yet there are misconceptions about induction and, in parti-
cular, about generalization in information systems research.
Lee and Baskerville (2003) is the major treatment of generali-
zation in the IS literature.  They warn us that uncritical appli-
cation of statistical sampling-based generalizability as the
norm for all generalizability may result in inappropriate
evaluations of many studies.  They attempt to “clarify the
concept of generalizability by critically examining its nature,
illustrating its use and misuse, and presenting a framework for
classifying its different forms” (p. 221).  They are centrally
concerned with “statistical generalization.”  This occurs when
a researcher observes a characteristic of a sample of a popula-
tion then infers that the population itself has that charac-
teristic, within a margin of error.  Lee and Baskerville claim
that “its uncritical application as the norm for all generali-
zability can lead to an improper assessment of the generali-
zability of many research studies” (p. 221).
They also invoke Hume’s problem of induction (originally
published in 1748) to support their commitment to the claim 
that statistical generalization is unjustifiable.2  Nonetheless
1Detmar Straub was the accepting senior editor for this paper. 
2Lee and Baskerville say that “we affirm the legitimacy of statistical
generalizability, where we emphasize that it refers to the generalizability of
one random sample to other random samples that would result from applying
the same sampling procedure to the same population or the generalizability
of sample points to a sample estimate” (p. 228) as opposed to “the generaliz-
ability of the sample estimate to the corresponding population characteristic”
(p. 226).  They endorse “Hume’s truism” that “induction or generalization
is never fully justified logically” (p. 225), and add that “the latter generaliz-
ability, according to Hume’s truism, cannot be improved (or, for that matter,
even established) by increasing the sample size” (p. 226, emphasis added).
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Table 1.  Examples of Confusion Caused by Lee and Baskerville
Confusion Example
Conflating induction with
deduction
When discussing the advantages and possible difficulties of professionally qualified doctoral
students, Klein and Rowe (2008) adopt Lee and Baskerville’s classification.  In their Table 2,
which is adapted from Lee and Baskerville’s Figure 5, they follow Lee and Baskerville in
calling Type TE generalizability deduction.  But generalization is a form of induction, not
deduction.
Misunderstanding the nature
of statistical generalization
Olsson et al. (2008, p. 265) state that Lee and Baskerville “present an overarching frame-
work that proposes four distinct categories of generalizing, only one of which corresponds to
statistical sampling-based generalization.” Statistical generalization is included by Lee and
Baskerville under Type EE generalizability which, as we will show, is problematic.  In con-
trast, statistical generalization is properly typified in our classification as within-population
generalization.
Misunderstanding the
relationship between theory
and generalization
When discussing the implications of their action research results, Lindgren et al. (2004, p.
466) highlight Lee and Baskerville’s point that “a theory may never be generalized to a
setting where it has not yet been empirically tested and confirmed” (p. 241).  As we will
show, this claim is inconsistent with the meaning of theory.
Conflating empirical testing
with generalization
Venkatesh and Ramesh (2006, p. 184) say that “Lee and Baskerville (2003) highlight the
importance of establishing generalizability of a theoretical concept to different settings” (i.e.,
Type TE generalizability) and use Type TE generalizability to justify the contribution of their
two empirical studies.  But Type TE generalizability is empirical testing, not generalization. 
Conflating empirical testing
with generalization
When discussing the limitations of their study, Ragu-Nathan et al. (2008, p. 430) note that
“replicating this study in other sectors, such as health care, for example, would lead to
empirical generalization of these theoretical relationships (Lee and Baskerville 2003).” By
“empirical generalization” they appear to mean Type TE generalizability.  But replicating
their studies in other sectors is testing, not generalizing, the theoretical relationships.
they claim that despite Hume’s problem of induction, “a
larger sample size does increase generalizability, but it is the
generalizability of a sample to other samples, not to the popu-
lation” (p. 227).  Then they identify four types of generali-
zation.  These are empirical statement to empirical statement
(EE), empirical statement to theory (ET), theory to empirical
statement (TE), and theory to theory (TT).  Lee and Basker-
ville’s pioneering paper has proven to be influential.  Alas it
is not entirely unproblematic.  In Table 1, we give some
examples of the confusion caused by their treatment.
To grapple with Hume’s problem of induction, we must first
understand induction.  An inference is inductive when and
only when it is an inference from matters of fact that we have
observed to those we have not (Cambridge Dictionary of
Philosophy 1999, p. 745).  Hume’s problem of induction is his
argument that the use of induction—including statistical
generalization—is unjustifiable.  Lee and Baskerville are
committed to endorsing this and so must deny that an increase
in sample size increases the probability that the population
has the characteristic found in the sample.  This is because
any statistical generalization, however large the sample, is
still as much an inductive inference as the case in which the
sample consists of just one member of the population, and so
is equally unjustified.
In the next section we explain Hume’s problem of induction.
Then we show that Lee and Baskerville’s claim—that Hume’s
problem of induction imposes “no prohibition of the conclu-
sion that an increase in sample size leads to an increase in the
generalizability of one sample to other samples that the same
sampling procedure would produce” (p. 228)—does not hold
up to close scrutiny.  In Appendix A, we give a balance-of-
evidence argument that it is reasonable to assume that there is
some solution to Hume’s problem, even if we do not know
what the solution is.  In the following two sections we make
objections to Lee and Baskerville’s account of generalization
as well as their classification of it into four types.  We offer
repairs of these problems.  On this basis of discussion we pro-
pose a classification of induction, within which we distinguish
five types of generalization.  These are (1) theoretical,
(2) within-population, (3) cross-population, (4) contextual,
and (5) temporal, with theoretical generalization being across
the empirical and theoretical levels and the rest within the
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empirical level.  Our classification also includes two kinds of
inductive reasoning that do not belong to the domain of
generalization.  Our classification of induction distinguishes
it from generalization, and so rectifies conceptual confusion
inherited from Lee and Baskerville’s treatment of generali-
zation.  To further explain our objections to Lee and Basker-
ville, we discuss the implications of our classification of
induction for IS research before ending with some brief
concluding remarks.  We also summarize the key points of
Lee and Baskerville’s paper in Appendix B.
Hume’s Problem of Induction
To understand Hume’s problem of induction we need to
briefly review the terms of logic within which it is framed. 
An inference is deductive when and only when it is supposed
to be valid; in other words, if its premises are true, then its
conclusion must be true (Copi and Cohen 1990; Hurley 2003).
Otherwise it is invalid.  As we noted, it is inductive when and
only when it is an inference from observed matters of fact to
unobserved matters of fact.  Deductive inferences may estab-
lish conclusions with certainty, whereas inductive inference
may only establish them with high probability (Copi and
Cohen 1990).  An inductive inference is strong to the degree
that its conclusion is probably true, given the truth of its
premises (Hurley 2003).
Can we justify any inductive inference?  If the answer is yes,
then we may justify our belief that induction is reliable and so
justify our use of induction.  But Hume argues that no justi-
fication is possible.  Take the following:
A P1 In all of countless previous cases without exception,
objects that are terrestrial have been observed to
obey the law of gravity.
C All terrestrial objects will be observed to obey the
law of gravity.
Plainly A is invalid because there is no contradiction in sup-
posing that the law of gravity will suddenly cease operating.
We could make it valid by adding an extra premise P2:
B P1 In all of countless previous cases without exception,
objects that are terrestrial have been observed to
obey the law of gravity.
P2 If, in all of countless previous cases without excep-
tion, objects that are terrestrial have been observed
to obey the law of gravity, then all terrestrial objects
will be observed to obey the law of gravity.
C All terrestrial objects will be observed to obey the
law of gravity.
Now the problem is in justifying P2.  P2 assumes that nature
is uniform; in other words, that laws of nature will always
continue to operate.  But what reason is there to accept this?
Once again, there is no contradiction in supposing that laws
of nature, such as the law of gravity, will cease operating.
Why can’t we just say an inference such as A is strong?  Then
we are making the following inference: 
C P1 In past experience, all terrestrial objects have been
observed to obey the law of gravity.
C All terrestrial objects to be observed will probably
obey the law of gravity.
This does not help because C is invalid.  To make it valid, we
must add a second premise P2:
D P1 In past experience, all terrestrial objects have been
observed to obey the law of gravity.
P2 If, in past experience, all terrestrial objects have
been observed to obey the law of gravity, then all
terrestrial objects to be observed will probably obey
the law of gravity.
C All terrestrial objects to be observed will probably
obey the law of gravity.
But there is no reason to accept P2.  Why should we think that
scientific laws have a propensity to resemble the past in signi-
ficant ways?  One’s answer cannot be that they have always
had this propensity, for that would be to use induction, which
is what needs justification.
We could point out that although inductive inferences with
true premises are not guaranteed to have true conclusions,
they have mostly had true conclusions in the past.  But since
we are interested in justifying our continuing use of induction,
we would have to argue:
E P1 Past uses of inference A have given us conclusions
that were mostly true.
C Future uses of inference A will give us conclusions
that are mostly true.
But E is itself an inductive inference.  If the law of gravity
stops operating forever, E will have a true premise and a false
conclusion.  We are back where we started.
In sum, we have failed to provide a deductive justification of
induction.  We have failed to provide an inductive justifica-
tion of induction, since we cannot assume what we are trying
to justify.  Therefore, assuming that justification is either
deductive or inductive, there is no justification of induction.
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Given this dismaying result, it is a waste of time to use any
inductive inference—including statistical generalization—in
scientific research.  It is equally a waste of time to use induc-
tion to formulate a general theory on the basis of a set of
particular observations.  It is even futile to report the single
observation of a particular phenomenon.  This is because once
we have finished observing the phenomenon and started to
report it, we need a reason to think that what we have started
to report remains anything like what we have just observed.
This reason must be inductive.  We do not even have any
reason for the commonsensical belief that the ground won’t
swallow us up at the next step. The upshot is that science—
and commonsense as well—is a waste of time.3
However, as we indicate in Appendix A, the history of the
philosophy of science is replete with attempts to solve the
problem.  Strawson (1952) argues—defensibly, so we try to
show—that the very question of justification is misconceived
and that at best the question amounts to an inappropriate
imposition of the standards of deduction upon induction.  The
logical empiricist Reichenbach (1938) argues for the prag-
matic conclusion that from a decision-theoretic perspective of
maximizing utility, using induction is our best possible bet. 
It might be argued that Hume himself has a nonlogical
justification in mind.4
Have Lee and Baskerville Escaped
Hume’s Problem of Induction?
Lee and Baskerville claim that although Hume’s problem of
induction cannot be solved, and that therefore no inductive
inference can be logically justified, nonetheless “a larger
sample size does increase generalizability, but it is the
generalizability of a sample to other samples, not to the
population” (p. 227).  They also make their claim in a dif-
ferent way:  “there is no prohibition of the conclusion that an
increase in sample size leads to an increase in the generaliz-
ability of one sample to other samples that the same sampling
procedure would produce” (p. 228).  Here prohibition is
elliptical for “prohibition by the insolubility of Hume’s prob-
lem of induction.”
By now it should be obvious why this claim does not hold up,
given that Hume’s problem of induction cannot be solved:  to
generalize from observation of a characteristic of a sample to
a conclusion about that characteristic in other samples that we
have not observed involves an inference from what we have
observed to what we have not observed.  If Hume is correct,
this is not justified.  In fact, if he is correct, we are not even
logically justified in reporting the result of any observation,
once we have made it.  This is because we need a reason to
think that once we have finished observing a phenomenon and
started reporting, the phenomenon still resembles what we
have just observed.  For example, once we have finished
observing that litmus paper has turned red, we need to assume
that it remains red once we have shifted our attention away
from it.  Hume would argue that we have no logical justifi-
cation for this assumption.  This last point is related to what
we call “temporal generalization” in our classification of
induction.  In our opinion, Lee and Baskerville have not con-
sidered the serious implications of Hume’s problem of
induction.  Its insolubility means the end of science.
Moreover, they are committed in the following two ways to
claiming that Hume’s problem of induction is insoluble.  First,
they say that they will “focus on Hume’s truism, which calls
attention to an irremediable problem in induction” (p. 224).
They endorse Rosenberg’s “succinct description of Hume’s
truism” (p. 225), which is that induction may be justified
neither deductively nor inductively, and that “accordingly,
claims that transcend available data, in particular predictions
and general laws, remain unwarranted” (Rosenberg 1993, p.
75).  They call this “the problem of induction” (p. 224).  It
follows that they must say that the problem of induction,
namely that induction is not justified or warranted in any
sense, is insoluble, or as they say “irremediable.”
Second, what makes them assert that “a theory generalized
from the empirical descriptions in a particular case study has
no generalizability beyond the given case” (p. 236) is the
putative insolubility of Hume’s problem of induction.  Their
view is also clearly reflected by their saying that “as a conse-
quence of Hume’s truism, a theory may never be generalized
to a setting where it has not yet been empirically tested and
confirmed” (p. 241).
In Appendix A, we argue for the verdict that there is some
solution to Hume’s problem, even if we do not know what the
3It is obviously unfair to object that this conclusion contradicts commonsense
unless we have already faulted Hume’s argument.  It might be objected
instead that Hume himself believed in the value of induction—both com-
monsensical and scientific.  Fortunately we need not enter into textual
exegesis to decide on the truth of this claim, because even if it is true, all that
it shows is that Hume himself did not see the serious implications of his own
problem.  What Hume certainly thought is that our use of induction is a
psychologically engrained habit—as he puts it, a “custom”—that we cannot
shed.  We cannot refrain from causal inference any more than we can refrain
from breathing. This might be offered as a nonlogical justification of
induction.  But a skeptic could reply that this means that human nature dooms
us to irrationality, because we cannot help that our thought processes run in
a direction that is unjustified.
4In terms of custom as discussed in the preceding note.
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solution is.  This verdict has practical benefits:  scientists may
continue to trust the standard view that inductive inference is
strong provided we have a big enough sample size relative to
the population concerned when inferring from sample
characteristics to population characteristics.  It also removes
what Lee and Baskerville think is an obstacle to the helpful
and orthodox view held by researchers that an increase in the
size of a sample strengthens the inference to the conclusion
about the population from which it is drawn.
This view coheres with commonsense.  Suppose that a
random sample of 100 companies in Tokyo shows that 40
percent of them have the position of chief information officer.
Another random sample of 1,000 companies in Tokyo also
shows that 40 percent of them have the position of chief
information officer.  It hardly needs to be argued that the
inference to the conclusion that about 40 percent of all com-
panies in Tokyo have the position of chief information officer
is stronger in the second case.
Our verdict also allows us to reach a theory by generalizing
it from observations, although we may conjecture it as well. 
Another benefit of endorsing the verdict is that there is no
longer an obstacle to producing a classification of general-
ization—and therefore no longer an obstacle to Lee and
Baskerville’s own classification.
We have shown that Lee and Baskerville do not appreciate
the serious implications of Hume’s problem of induction.  We
remedy this in Appendix A with a balance-of-evidence argu-
ment for the verdict that there is some solution to the problem.
In order to motivate our classification of induction, we now
turn to Lee and Baskerville’s discussion of generalization and
their classification of it into four types.  We will discuss its
limitations and propose repairs.
Lee and Baskerville on
Generalization
There are three problems with Lee and Baskerville’s discus-
sion of generalization:
(1) Their definition of it is not the sense used by researchers
in natural or social sciences.
(2) Their definition of induction is too narrow.
(3) Their characterization of generalization contradicts their
own definition of it.
We discuss each of these problems in turn, proposing repairs.
Lee and Baskerville’s definition of generalization is not the
sense used by researchers in natural or social sciences.  Lee
and Baskerville cite the Oxford English Dictionary (1989)
when defining generalize as “to form general notions by
abstraction from particular instances” (p. 221).  But lexicog-
raphers often give different definitions.  They list primary
senses first, followed by others that may be less common or
more specialized.  For generalize, the Oxford English Dic-
tionary starts with “reduce to general laws,” followed by
“infer (a conclusion, law, etc.) inductively from particulars,”
“draw general inferences from,” and then Lee and Basker-
ville’s favored “form general notions by abstraction from
particular instances” followed by “bring into general use” (as
in “this style of writing e-mails has become more gener-
alized”).  The American dictionary, Merriam-Webster, adds
“spread or extend throughout the body” (as in “the cancer has
become more generalized from the pancreas,” or analogically,
“the distrust of IT has generalized within the company from
the HR department”).  Which sense of generalize are we
supposed to think of?  The question matters because although
there may be multiple senses of a term, there are wrong
usages of words.5
Moreover some usages of generalize might be irrelevant to IS
researchers.  Certainly the Merriam-Webster sense seems
peripheral.  What of the sense that Lee and Baskerville single
out?  One might naturally think of the movement from
observation of particular phenomena to something more
general as terminating not in a conclusion, but rather the
formation of a concept (in other words, a notion) of X, the
possession of which is just one’s ability to reliably distinguish
Xs from non-Xs.  One difference between generalization as
inductive inference and generalization as concept formation
is that in concept formation there is no conclusion that needs
to be ascertained to be true or false.  Another difference is that
coming to a conclusion is not coming to form a concept,
although of course one needs to have already acquired con-
cepts in order to arrive at a conclusion, because one must have
had those concepts that are embodied in the thought of the
conclusion.  We admit that cognitive psychologists may well
be interested in concept formation.  But the IS researchers for
whom Lee and Baskerville write are primarily interested in
inference.  Moreover, Lee and Baskerville focus on Hume’s
problem of induction, so generalization as a form of induction
must be the type of generalization with which they are con-
cerned.6  So Lee and Baskerville’s definition of generalization
5For example, one may not sensibly use “right” to mean “wrong” anymore
than Humpty Dumpty sensibly used “glory” to mean “a nice knock-down
argument” (Carroll 1871, p. 45).
6We owe this sharp point to a reviewer of our paper.
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is not the central sense of the term as it is used in practice by
such researchers.
Our repair is to propose a more precise, inference-based defi-
nition.  For any two statements P and Q, Q is more general
than P when and only when the class of entities that P is
about is a subset of the class of entities that Q is about.  Thus
“all metals expand when heated” is more general than “all
liquid metals expand when heated.”  Then we may say that for
any two statements, P and Q, Q is a generalization of P when
and only when (1) Q is inferred from P, and (2) Q is more
general than P.  Thus,
P1 All the metals we experimented with today in the lab
expanded when heated.
C All metals expand when heated.
is a generalization because C is more general than P1, from
which it is inferred.  This characterization of generalization,
in the context of logic, is consistent with that of Copi and
Cohen (1990) and Hurley (2003).
(2) Lee and Baskerville’s definition of induction is too
narrow.  Lee and Baskerville then define induction as “a
reasoning process that begins with statements of particulars
and ends in a general statement” (p. 224).  This definition is
too narrow, a point well made by Copi and Cohen and by
Hurley, because there are at least two forms of inductive
inference that do not proceed from particular premises to a
general conclusion, both of which may be usefully employed
in scientific contexts.  One of these is what logicians call
statistical syllogism (Gensler 2001), for example:
P1 Nearly all senior IT managers in the UK have
college degrees.
P2 Tom is a senior IT manager in the UK.
C Tom has a college degree.7
This inference is inductive, because it goes from observed
matters of fact to unobserved matters of fact and so cannot
hope to establish its conclusion with certainty, but only with
high probability.  Yet the inference goes from a general
premise and a particular premise to a particular conclusion. 
So it is not a generalization.
Another form of inductive inference is what logicians call
inductive analogy (Copi and Cohen 1990; Hurley 2003), for
example:
P1 Peter’s computer has the Windows Vista operating
system and McAfee anti-virus software, and Peter
never visits dubious websites or downloads files
from e-mails of unfamiliar senders to his computer.
P2 Mary’s computer has the Windows Vista operating
system and McAfee anti-virus software, and Mary
never visits dubious websites or downloads files
from e-mails of unfamiliar senders to her computer.
P3 Peter’s computer is virus-free.
C Mary’s computer is virus-free.
This inference is also inductive, because it also goes from
observed matters of fact to unobserved matters of fact.  But
the inference goes from particular premises to a particular
conclusion.  So this is not generalization either.
We have demonstrated that Lee and Baskerville’s definition
of induction is too narrow, especially for practical use by
researchers.  The result is that scholars will probably ignore
some types of induction that may be usefully considered.  Our
repair is to say that an inference is inductive when and only
when it goes from observed matters of fact to unobserved
matters of fact.  Not only is this consistent with standard
usage, it also has the advantage that IS researchers may
consider how to use these two important forms of induction.
(3) Lee and Baskerville’s characterization of generalization
contradicts their own definition of generalization.  Lee and
Baskerville assert that “the generalizability of an IS theory to
different settings is important” (p. 221).  Their idea of gener-
alizing from theory (i.e., general notions) to settings (i.e.,
particular instances) simply contradicts their own adopted
definition of generalization, which refers to forming general
notions by abstraction from particular instances.
Our repair is to replace the term generalizability in their
statement with applicability, which refers to how far a theory
covers certain empirical phenomena.  A theory is more
general when its domain of applicability is wider, and ac-
cordingly, its predictive and explanatory power greater.  Later
in their article, Lee and Baskerville ask
what might scientific researchers do so that they may
recommend their theories for application in new
7An inference of the form 
P1 Nearly all (or most or 67%) Fs are Gs.
P2 X is an F.
C X is a G.
has two premises and so is ipso facto a syllogism, albeit not a categorical
syllogism.  The syllogism is “statistical” in the sense that the first premise
reports a precise statistic (67%) or a vague range of statistics.  Thus “most Fs
are Gs” means that more than 50% but less than 100% of Fs are Gs.  “Nearly
all Fs are Gs” means that less than 100% of Fs are Gs but significantly more
than 50%—arguably more than 90%—of Fs are Gs.  At the upper boundary
of 100% the inference becomes deductively valid.  The term statistical
syllogism is standard in logic and philosophy of science.
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settings, where the theories have not yet been
empirically tested and confirmed in those settings?
(p. 240)
This time, in line with our critique, they use the proper term
application.  Our alternative characterization avoids all these
problems.
Lee and Baskerville’s Four Types
of Generalization
Lee and Baskerville classify generalization into four types. 
Their classification is based on a distinction between empi-
rical and theoretical statements:
Empirical statements can refer to data, measure-
ments, observations, or descriptions about empirical
or real-world phenomena, while theoretical state-
ments posit the existence of entities and relation-
ships that cannot be directly observed, and hence
can only be theorized (p. 232).
Based on this distinction, they classify generalization as
empirical statement to empirical statement (EE), empirical
statement to theory (ET), theory to empirical statement (TE),
and theory to theory (TT).
This distinction faces two objections.  First, their characteri-
zation of an empirical statement cannot serve as a definition
because it is circular; to understand what makes a statement
empirical, we must first understand what makes real-world
phenomena empirical.  Since empirical means “based on what
is experienced” (Cambridge International Dictionary of
English), our repair is to say that a statement is empirical
when and only when it cannot be ascertained to be true or
false without experience or observation.  This definition
coheres with empirical statements defined by Merriam-
Webster Dictionary as those “capable of being verified or
disproved by observation or experiment,” since both observa-
tion and experiment involve experience.  Even an anthropo-
logical interpretivist who produces a rich description of a
particular Maasai in the Serengeti without generalizing this to
conclusions about other Maasai would accept that a statement
such as “Idi wears cowhide sandals and carries a wooden
club” is empirical in the philosophically uncontentious way
we have defined it.
Second, theoretical statements need not posit the existence of
entities and relationships that cannot be directly observed. 
They may or may not posit them.  Newton’s laws of motion
certainly constitute a theory, but they are about observable
relations between perfectly ordinary, observable objects.  Our
repair is to say that a statement is theoretical when and only
when it is a generalization that purports to predict and explain
the phenomena to which it refers.  This accommodates the
fact that some, but not all, theoretical statements posit rela-
tionships between what is directly observable.
As we will now show, Lee and Baskerville go on to mis-
characterize each of the so-called four types of generalization,
even within their own terms.  In particular, only what they
call “Type ET generalizability” is really generalization.
Type EE Generalizability:  Generalizing
from Data to Description
There are three problems with Lee and Baskerville’s discus-
sion of this type.  First, in order to illustrate the generalization
of data to a measurement, Lee and Baskerville use the
example of calculating the sample mean from sample points
(pp. 233-234).  But a sample estimate is deduced and not
induced from sample points.  To fix this problem, they should
either drop the example from their position or use it to
illustrate deduction instead.
Second, in stressing the importance of validating a measure-
ment instrument, Lee and Baskerville state:
In the situation where the measurement instrument
has not been validated, the data collected from a
research subject would lack generalizability to any
valid measurement for that individual (p. 234).
This does not involve any sense of generalize that charac-
terizes inference.  If an instrument of measurement, such as a
thermometer, has not been validated in the sense of having
been checked for accuracy, it is uncertain whether the data
generated by the instrument accurately indicate what is
intended to be measured.  This straightforward methodo-
logical point has nothing to do with generalizability.  Of
course Hume might add that even if it has been checked for
accuracy (past readings of the thermometer having been
observed to be accurate), that is no reason to think that it will
continue to be so.  Thus, since Lee and Baskerville think that
Hume’s problem of induction is insoluble, there is no point in
classifying this type of generalization in the first place.
Third, Lee and Baskerville claim, 
From this particular set of field data, an ethnog-
rapher could generalize the description that, in the
world of these officers, autonomy is indeed highly
valued—so much so, in fact, that the officers will
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conjure up busywork to satisfy their sergeant, dis-
tract his attention, and thereby otherwise preserve
their autonomy (p. 234).
The description in question is supposed to be an empirical
statement because Type EE generalizability is about general-
izing from empirical statements to other empirical statements.
However, Lee and Baskerville state that “theoretical state-
ments posit the existence of entities and relationships that
cannot be directly observed, and hence can only be theorized”
(p. 232).  But surely autonomy and attention cannot be
directly observed—at the very least not in the way in which
we directly observe litmus paper turning red.8  So the descrip-
tion is a theoretical statement, and should not be classified as
Type EE generalizability.  Another supposedly empirical
statement, “autonomy is highly valued in the eyes of the
officers” (p. 235), faces the same problem.  One remedy is to
adopt the definitions of empirical and theoretical statements
we recommend above.  According to these definitions, Lee
and Baskerville’s discussion is about generalizing from
empirical data to theoretical descriptions.  Thus, it belongs to
Type ET generalizability.
Type ET Generalizability:  Generalizing
from Description to Theory
Based on Hume’s argument, Lee and Baskerville state that “a
theory generalized from the empirical descriptions in a parti-
cular case study has no generalizability beyond the given
case” (p. 236).  They reiterate this claim in a slightly different
way:  “a theory may never be generalized to a setting where
it has not yet been empirically tested and confirmed” (p. 241).
But a theory consists of general statements that extend beyond
the empirical data from which the theory is developed.  More
formally, a theory is “a hypothetico-deductive system—that
is, a system of hypotheses within which valid arguments (i.e.,
deductive chains) can be constructed” (Bunge 1996, p. 114). 
If a theory cannot be applied to phenomena beyond such data,
it should not be called a theory in the first place (see Nagel
1979).
Type TE Generalizability:  Generalizing
from Theory to Description
There are two problems with Lee and Baskerville’s discussion
of this type, both of which are remediable.  First, they stipu-
late that
Type TE generalizability…involves generalizing
from theoretical statements…to empirical statements
(here, descriptions of what the practitioner can
expect to observe in his specific organization if he
were to apply the theory) (p. 237).
Although empirical statements may be general, such as “all
big companies currently in Tokyo have management informa-
tion systems departments,” theoretical statements are, by their
nature, necessarily general.  Therefore, Lee and Baskerville’s
own definition of generalization, which has it that general-
ization consists in “generalizing from particular instances to
general notions” (p. 232) rules out TE inferences as cases of
generalization.  So Lee and Baskerville contradict themselves
within their own terms.
Second, Lee and Baskerville claim that “Type TE general-
izability happens to be closely related to empirical testing” (p.
237).  But Type TE generalizability just is empirical testing. 
It is related to generalization in the sense that if a theory’s
prediction is confirmed in settings that are different from the
one where the theory has been tested and confirmed, this indi-
cates that the results of the original setting might be gener-
alized to other settings.  Nevertheless, this concerns gener-
alizing research results from one setting to others, not gener-
alizing from theoretical statements to empirical statements. 
Our repair is to relabel what Lee and Baskerville call Type TE
generalizability as empirical testing or deductive prediction. 
In fact, they approach this repair themselves by saying that
Type TE generalizability “is actually deduction, not induc-
tion” (p. 241).
Type TT Generalizability:  Generalizing
from Concepts to Theory
There are again three problems with Lee and Baskerville’s
discussion of this type:  the discussion is incoherent, inter-
nally inconsistent, and irrelevant to generalization in the true
sense of the term.
First, Lee and Baskerville stipulate that “in Type TT gener-
alizability, a researcher generalizes from theoretical proposi-
tions in the form of concepts…to the theoretical propositions
that make up a theory” (p. 238).  But this stipulation is
incoherent, because concepts are not propositions.  Even a
theoretical concept such as the concept of an electron is not
itself a proposition, theoretical or not.  Understanding the
theoretical proposition that all metals expand when heated
requires possessing the concepts of metals and heat, but it
does not follow that this proposition is a concept.  If one
acquires the concept of a metal then one acquires the ability
to reliably distinguish metals from nonmetals, but one does
not thereby acquire a theory.
8Nor can what the redness of litmus paper measures, namely acidity, be
directly observed.
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Second, Lee and Baskerville’s own definition of gener-
alization rules out generalizing from concepts to theories,
because concepts are not particular instances.  An electron is
an instance of the concept of an electron, but it is not a
concept, only an electron.  Concepts are used to formulate a
theory (Kaplan 1964), and cannot be generalized to a theory. 
Thus Lee and Baskerville’s account is internally inconsistent.
Third, their discussion of the first form of Type TT gener-
alization is in fact about inconsistent operationalization of
constructs.  The discussion of the second form is about con-
structing a theory from concepts extracted from the literature. 
But none of these discussions are related in the remotest sense
to inference, let alone generalization.  So their discussion is
irrelevant to generalization in the true sense of the term. 
Given this, it is no wonder that Lee and Baskerville’s discus-
sion of Gefen and Straub’s (1997) study does not clarify how
we are supposed to generalize from concepts to theory.  In
fact, it may lead us into misunderstanding.  One repair is to
delete the reference to generalization and focus on discussing
construct operationalization and theory construction.
This is not to say, however, that there is no connection
between less general theories and more general ones.  A fact
may be explained by a theory and that theory also may be
explained by a more general theory.  For example, the fact
that all liquid metals expand when heated may be explained
by the theory that all metals expand when heated.  The fact
that all metals expand when heated may be explained by the
more general theory that heating something raises its molecu-
lar kinetic energy.  Thus less general theories may be deduced
from more general ones.  The explanandum may be seen as a
theory or a fact.  We may choose to call it a fact that all liquid
metals expand when heated, but it is not an empirical fact,
because it is impossible to observe every liquid metal—past,
present, and future in any spatial location of the universe—
expanding when heated.  Hume, of course, might say that this
means that we have no business calling it a fact.
The same points hold for social sciences.  Consider, for
instance, Van Maanen’s (1983) point that policemen stake out
bars frequented by drunk patrons, as cited in Lee and
Baskerville’s discussion of Type EE generalizability.  The
policemen’s behavior—which is not itself a theory—can be
explained by the theory that policemen stake out locations
where armed robberies are likely and that bars where drunk
patrons are found are such locations.  This theory is in turn
explained by a more general theory that officials in authority
stake out locations where violent crime is likely and that
places where drunks are found are such locations—because
the less general theory may be deduced from the more general
one.  By contrast, no theory may be induced from another
because induction is an inference from observed matters of
fact to unobserved matters of fact, but while theories explain
empirical observation, they are not observed matters of fact.
A Summary of Problems
and Solutions
We have gone a long way in discussing the problems of Lee
and Baskerville’s paper and proposing repairs.  Before pre-
senting our classification of induction in the next section, we
summarize these problems and repairs in Table 2.
A Classification of Induction
To classify induction, we first distinguish two levels of
research activities, namely empirical and theoretical, which
correspond broadly to Lee and Baskerville’s distinction
between empirical and theoretical statements.  On the empi-
rical level, researchers collect data through observation; on
the theoretical level, researchers develop theories based on
data collected on the empirical level, pure conjectures, or a
combination of both.  The classification is pictorially pre-
sented in Figure 1, where the arrows represent inferences. 
There are five basic types of generalization:  (1) theoretical,
(2) within-population, (3) cross-population, (4) contextual,
and (5) temporal, with theoretical generalization being across
the empirical and theoretical levels and the rest within the
empirical level.  Our classification also includes the two
above-mentioned kinds of inductive reasoning that do not
belong to the domain of generalization:  statistical syllogism
and inductive analogy.  Both are within the empirical level.
The five types of generalization have their roots in the
literature.  To begin with, Gomm et al. (2000) and Sharp
(1998) classify generalization into two main types:  theo-
retical and empirical.  Our classification further classifies
empirical generalization into four types.  Theoretical gener-
alization corresponds to Yin’s (2003) analytic generalization,
in which “the investigator is striving to generalize a particular
set of results to some broader theory” (p. 37), and embodies
one of the five fundamental principles that scientists use in
making generalizations (Shadish et al. 2002).  Within-
population generalization and cross-population generalization
are concerned with where a sample is located—inside or
outside—relative to the population at which generalization is
targeted.  A similar distinction between these two kinds of
generalization can be found in the literature.  For example,
Maxwell (1992) distinguishes between internal and external
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Table 2.  A Summary of Solutions to the Major Problems in Lee and Baskerville
Problem Evidence Solution
Hume’s problem of induction
Non-recognition of the serious
implications of accepting that
Hume’s problem of induction is
irremediable
“ there is no prohibition of the conclusion
that an increase in sample size leads to an
increase in the generalizability of one
sample to other samples that the same
sampling procedure would produce” (p. 228)
Adopt a two-stage balance-of-evidence
argument that it is reasonable to
assume that there is some plausible
solution to Hume’s problem, even if we
do not know which solution it is
Definitions of generalization and induction
Definition of generalization is not
consistent with the sense used
by researchers in the natural and
social sciences
“ to form general notions by abstraction from
particular instances” (p. 221)
Adopt an alternative definition:  for any
two statements P and Q, Q is a
generalization of P when and only when
1) Q is inferred from P, and 2) Q is
more general than P
Definition of induction is too
narrow
“ a reasoning process that begins with
statements of particulars and ends in a
general statement” (p. 224)
Adopt an alternative definition:  an
inference is inductive when and only
when it goes from observed matters of
fact to unobserved matters of fact
Statement about generalizability
contradicts Lee and Baskerville’s
own definition of generalization
“ the generalizability of an IS theory to
different settings is important” (p. 221)
Replace “generalizability” in the
statement by “applicability”
Definitions of empirical and theoretical statements
Definition of empirical
statements is circular
“Empirical statements can refer to data,
measurements, observations, or
descriptions about empirical or real-world
phenomena” (p. 232)
Adopt an alternative definition:  a
statement is empirical when and only
when it cannot be ascertained to be true
or false without observation or
experience
Definition of theoretical
statements as necessarily
positing the existence of entities
and relationships that cannot be
directly observed
“ theoretical statements posit the existence
of entities and relationships that cannot be
directly observed, and hence can only be
theorized” (p. 232)
Adopt an alternative definition:  a
statement is theoretical when and only
when it is a generalization that purports
to predict and explain the phenomena to
which it refers
Type EE generalizability
Example of deduction illustrates
the generalization of data to a
measurement 
The example of calculating the sample mean
from sample points on  pp. 233-234
Drop the example or use it to illustrate
deduction
Statement about validating
measurement instrument does
not involve any sense of
generalization that characterizes
inference
“In the situation where the measurement
instrument has not been validated, the data
collected from a research subject would lack
generalizability to any valid measurement for
that individual” (p. 234)
Delete the statement and its related
discussion
Statement about field data
contradicts Lee and Baskerville’s
own definitions of empirical and
theoretical statements
“From this particular set of field data, an
ethnographer could generalize the descrip-
tion that, in the world of these officers, auto-
nomy is indeed highly valued — so much so,
in fact, that the officers will conjure up busy-
work to satisfy their sergeant, distract his
attention, and thereby otherwise preserve
their autonomy” (p. 234)
Adopt the above-stated definitions of
empirical and theoretical statements
and place the statement and its related
discussion under Type ET
generalizability 
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Table 2.  A Summary of Solutions to the Major Problems in Lee and Baskerville (Continued)
Problem Evidence Solution
Type ET generalizability
Statement about “theories”
generalized from case study
descriptions entails that these
are not theories 
“ a theory generalized from the empirical
descriptions in a particular case study has
no generalizability beyond the given case”
(p. 236)
Delete the statement and its related
discussion
Type TE generalizability
Definition of Type TE generali-
zability contradicts Lee and
Baskerville’s own definition of
generalization
“Type TE generalizability…involves gener-
alizing from theoretical statements…to
empirical statements (here, descriptions of
what the practitioner can expect to observe
in his specific organization if he were to
apply the theory)” (p. 237)
Relabel Type TE generalizability as
“empirical testing” or “deductive
prediction” and revise the discussion
accordingly
Nonrecognition that Type TE
generalizability is empirical
testing and not generalization
“Type TE generalizability happens to be
closely related to empirical testing” (p. 237)
Relabel Type TE generalizability as
“empirical testing” or “deductive
prediction” and revise the discussion
accordingly
Type TT generalizability
Unintelligible and internally
inconsistent stipulation
“In Type TT generalizability, a researcher
generalizes from theoretical propositions in
the form of concepts … to the theoretical
propositions that make up a theory” (p. 238)
Delete the stipulation and its related
discussion
Discussion of inconsistent
operationalization of constructs
is unrelated to generalization
Discussion of the first form of Type TT
generalizability on p. 238
Delete the reference to generalization
and focus on discussing the
operationalization of constructs
Discussion of constructing a
theory from concepts extracted
from the literature is unrelated to
generalization
Discussion of the other form of Type TT
generalizability on p. 238
Delete the reference to generalization
and focus on discussing the
construction of theories 
generalizability in qualitative research, corresponding to our
within- and cross-population generalization, respectively. 
Similarly, Schofield (1990, p. 201) states “the aspect of
external validity that has typically received the lion’s share of
attention in textbook and other treatments of the concept is
generalizing to and across populations.”9 Contextual general-
ization and temporal generalization are derived from the
insightful comment of Nagel (1979), discussed below, con-
cerning the space–time constraint of social phenomena.
There are scattered discussions of the two types of gener-
alization in the literature.  Lucas (2003), for example,
discusses generalizing across settings, corresponding to
contextual generalization.  Cronbach’s (1975) argument that
generalizations in the social sciences decay rather fast over
time is related to temporal generalization.
For the two kinds of inductive reasoning, inductive analogy
bears some resemblance to Stake and Trumbull’s (1982)
concept of naturalistic generalization.  They argue that com-
pared to quantitative studies, case studies are more epistemo-
logically in harmony with the reader’s experience and, thus,
to that person, they form a natural base for generalization.  A
case often provides a thick description and a vicarious experi-
9The term external validity has been defined in various ways during the last
three decades.  For example, Cook and Campbell (1979, p. 37) defined it
rather imprecisely as “the approximate validity with which we can infer that
the presumed causal relationship can be generalized to and across alternate
measures of the cause and effect and across different types of persons,
settings, and times.” Later Cronbach (1982) developed an elaborate notional
system that covers four dimensions:  unit of analysis, treatment, outcome, and
setting.  Using the system, he distinguished between internal and external
validity.
MIS Quarterly Vol. 36 No. X/Forthcoming 2012 11
Tsang & Williams/Misconceptions, Clarifications, and a Classification of Induction
Figure 1.  Types of Induction
ential account.  The reader should be able to determine if and
how far the case can be used to understand a new setting.
Naturalistic generalization is a kind of tacit recognition of the
similarities and differences between a case and a new setting,
drawing on the personal experience and knowledge of the
reader.  In this sense, naturalistic generalization is somewhat
similar to inductive analogy.  Yet, as we argue above, this
kind of reasoning is not generalization and the term
generalization is thus misused by Stake and Trumbull.  In the
following discussion, we follow Lee and Baskerville and use
Gefen and Straub’s (1997) study to illustrate our classi-
fication.  For easy reference, we list the definitions of each
type of induction in Table 3.
Five Types of Generalization
Theoretical generalization, which is similar to Lee and
Baskerville’s Type ET generalizability, consists of general-
izing from research findings to theories.  Deriving theories
from data collected in the empirical world is a traditional view
of scientific research (Chalmers 1999).  Gefen and Straub’s
study is a good example of this.  Their findings suggest that
the same mode of communication may be perceived dif-
ferently by the sexes, and so they propose to extend the tech-
nology acceptance model by including the effects of gender. 
In other words, they generalize their results to a revised
theoretical model.
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Table 3.  Definition of Types of Induction
Type of Induction Definition
Theoretical generalization Generalizing from research findings to theories
Within-population generalization Generalizing from the characteristics of a sample to those of the corresponding
population
Cross-population generalization Generalizing from a sample in one population to members of another population, with
both populations existing in a similar context and a similar period of time
Contextual generalization Generalizing from a sample in one population to members of another population, with
both populations existing in significantly different contexts but within a similar period of
time
Temporal generalization Generalizing from a sample in one population at one point in time to members of the
same or a different population at another point in time, assuming that the context
remains more or less the same.
Statistical syllogism An inference of the form
P1 N % of Fs are Gs.
P2 X is an F.
C X is a G.
where “N” denotes a precise statistic or a vague range of statistics as in “Most” or
“Nearly all.”
Inductive analogy An inference of the form
P1 X has properties a, b, c … and z
P2 Y has properties a, b, c …
C Y has property z
Within-population generalization, which is equivalent to
statistical generalization, consists of generalizing from the
characteristics of a sample to those of the corresponding
population.  We prefer to use the term within-population
generalization instead of statistical generalization in order to
contrast this type of generalization with cross-population
generalization.  To perform within-population generalization,
researchers need to first clearly specify the intended popu-
lation in which their study is conducted, and then follow a
sampling procedure that allows statistical inference from
sample characteristics to population characteristics.  Unfor-
tunately, difficulties of research access often prevent
researchers from discussing how far their findings are statis-
tically generalizable.  That said, researchers should at least
clearly describe their sampling procedure.  Gefen and Straub’s
study has some room for improvement in this respect.  They
distributed questionnaires to users of the e-mail system in one
U.S., one Swiss, and one Japanese airline, without mentioning
the number of employees in each airline.  The only piece of
information about the sampling frame is this sentence:  “The
sample included workers across managerial, professional, and
technical ranks” (p. 395).  That is, employees across these
three ranks in each airline constituted a population.  Although
they report the response rate in each airline, they do not report
the sample size drawn from each airline.  As mentioned, a
larger sample size will usually increase the within-population
generalizability of the results of a study.
Cross-population generalization consists in generalizing from
a sample in one population to members of another population,
with both populations existing in a similar context and a
similar period of time.  Assume that Gefen and Straub had
broken up their data into three parts, each of which contained
data collected from one airline.  In this case, cross-population
generalization might consist in generalizing the results of the
American airline (in which Gefen and Straub collected data)
to another American airline that existed at the time of data
collection.  The contexts in which the two firms operate are
similar in the sense that they are in the same industry and the
same country.  Note that a different way of defining a popu-
lation will give rise to a different kind of cross-population
generalization.  Suppose that Gefen and Straub had conducted
their study in only one of the three airlines, and had drawn a
sample from the male employees of the airline only.  The
population would be the collection of male employees and
one kind of cross-population generalization would consist of
generalizing the findings to the population of female em-
ployees within that airline.  As the actual findings of Gefen
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and Straub’s study indicate that women and men differ in
their perceived social presence and perceived usefulness of e-
mail, the cross-population generalizability from male to
female employees would be weak.
In comparing the social sciences with the natural sciences,
Nagel (1979, p 459) observes that, “unlike the laws of physics
and chemistry, generalizations in the social sciences therefore
have at best only a severely restricted scope, limited to social
phenomena occurring during a relatively brief historical epoch
within special institutional settings.”  This observation implies
that social scientists have to investigate whether their research
findings collected in one space–time setting are generalizable
to other significantly different space–time settings; in other
words, whether these findings are contextually and temporally
generalizable.
In contextual generalization, researchers generalize from a
sample in one population to members of another population,
with both populations existing in significantly different
contexts but within a similar period of time.  As the domain
of management research in general, and IS research in
particular, is becoming more international, the applicability of
theories developed in one national context to other national
contexts has been seriously questioned (Hofstede 1993;
Rosenzweig 1994).  Some scholars call for contextualization
as “a way of approaching research where knowledge of the
settings to be studied is brought to bear in design and imple-
mentation decisions” (Rousseau and Fried 2001, p. 6).  By
paying greater attention to the context in which a study is
conducted, researchers are in a better position to assess the
contextual generalizability of their findings.  For example,
Gefen and Straub specifically included the effect of cultural
differences in their structural equations, and found that the
effect was significant.  This suggests that the generalizability
of their findings to other cultural contexts would be limited.
(We will discuss this issue in more detail below.)  There are
other types of context in addition to cultural or national
context.  Gefen and Straub conducted their study in the airline
industry.  The generalizability of their findings to another
industry depends on whether the new industrial context
significantly affects people’s perception and usage of e-mail.
Temporal generalization consists in generalizing from a
sample in one population at one point in time to members of
the same or a different population at another point in time,
assuming that the context remains more or less the same.
Temporal generalization is the least discussed in the literature.
Yet, it is implicitly present in any form of generalization in
the sense that the act of generalizing and the findings to be
generalized necessarily occur at different times.  Temporal
generalization is a more important issue in the social than the
natural sciences.  Nature is unaffected by scientific research.
The fact that the earth revolves around the sun will not be
changed by a theory proposing otherwise.  However, activities
of management researchers may change the beliefs and
practices of managers and thus undermine the stability of the
phenomena investigated (Numagami 1998).  Self-fulfilling
prophecy is a significant issue.  For example, managers who
are educated about the logic of transaction cost economics
tend to impose controls for curbing opportunism.  However,
such controls may have the consequence of encouraging more
difficult-to-detect opportunistic behavior (Ghoshal and Moran
1996).  In short, managers may alter their behavior on the
basis of the knowledge created by researchers (Knights 1992),
and temporal generalization is a very important concern when
one tries to generalize the findings of a study conducted in a
distant past to a current situation.  Gefen and Straub’s study
was done more than 10 years ago.  Can their findings be
generalized to today’s airlines in the United States?  Note that
the airline industry in the United States has undergone
significant changes since the September 11 terrorist attack. 
The much tighter security control in the industry may affect
how e-mail systems are structured and how e-mails are used
and monitored.
Generalization within the empirical level often involves a
combination of some of the four basic types discussed above. 
For example, if researchers try to generalize Gefen and
Straub’s findings to today’s airlines in Germany, this involves
across-population, contextual, and temporal generalization. 
A major problem of this kind of generalization is that if the
generalization is subsequently found to be wrong, it may be
difficult to identify whether the failure is due to differences in
population or contextual or temporal factors.
As indicated by Figure 1, theory, or the collection of theo-
retical knowledge, may be able to provide some useful
information about the four types of generalization within the
empirical level through deductive inference.  Gefen and
Straub, for instance, draw heavily on Hofstede’s (1980)
cultural dimension of masculinity–femininity in their study. 
The three countries in which they conducted their fieldwork,
namely Japan, Switzerland, and the United States are high in
masculinity.  In these countries, gender roles are clearly
defined and nurtured.  So the gender effects that Gefen and
Straub found in their study will probably be less generalizable
to countries that are low in masculinity, such as Norway and
Sweden.  In short, knowledge of the cultural dimension of
masculinity–femininity throws light on the contextual
generalizability of their findings.
Statistical Syllogism and Inductive Analogy
After covering the five types of generalization, we proceed to
discuss statistical syllogism and inductive analogy.  Figure 1
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shows that in statistical syllogism, researchers draw a con-
clusion about a particular instance from a generalization. 
Gefen and Straub’s findings support the proposition that
women perceive a higher social presence and usefulness of e-
mail than men.  Suppose we are interested in the differences
in the perception of e-mail between a particular pair of male
and female employees in the American airline in which Gefen
and Straub collected data.  We may use statistical syllogism
and conclude that the female employee is likely to perceive a
higher social presence and usefulness of e-mail than her male
counterpart.  Lee and Baskerville’s Type TE generalizability
is related to statistical syllogism in the sense that a general-
ization (i.e., theoretical statement) may be used to draw a con-
clusion about a particular instance (i.e., empirical statement).
In inductive analogy, researchers proceed from particular
premises to a conclusion about a particular instance.  Assume
that Gefen and Straub had run their analysis separately on the
data collected from the American airline, and suppose we are
interested in the gender differences in the perception of e-mail
among a group of employees drawn from another American
airline.  If there are substantial relevant similarities between
this airline and Gefen and Straub’s as well as between this
group of employees and Gefen and Straub’s sample, we may
conclude that their results probably also reflect the charac-
teristics of the group.  Should Gefen and Straub provide more
information about the airline and its employees that they
studied, this would facilitate inductive analogy.  Lee and
Baskerville’s Type EE generalizability is related to inductive
analogy in the sense that a finding obtained from one setting
(i.e., empirical statement) may be used to draw a conclusion
about a new but similar setting (i.e., empirical statement).
Unfortunately, when discussing Type EE generalizability, Lee
and Baskerville have ruled out inductive analogy by claiming
that “no descriptive statement (whether quantitative or
qualitative) is generalizable beyond the domain that the
researcher has actually observed” (p. 235).  Finally, their
Type TT generalizability is not a form of induction at all.
Implications for IS Research
Our classification helps IS researchers articulate the limita-
tions of their studies.  Since there are distinct types of
generalization, when IS researchers discuss the generalization
of their findings, it is important that they specify the kind of
generalization they have in mind.  However, this is often not
the case.  A typical example is:  “As a small sample-size,
single case study, generalizability cannot be assessed”
(Majchrzak et al. 2000, p. 594).  A pertinent question is:
Generalize to what?  Our classification highlights the need for
researchers to think about the kind of generalization they refer
to when they discuss the generalizability of their findings. 
This would help researchers clearly specify the limitations of
their studies and point to concrete future research directions
that may address these limitations.  Gefen and Straub’s
discussion is an excellent illustration:
From the standpoint of external validity, the study
gathered data from three firms in one industry across
three countries, which, per force, limits the gener-
ality of the results.  It may well be, for instance, that
there is a systematic bias in the airline industry that
restricts our ability to generalize to other industries. 
Moreover, knowledge workers in managerial,
professional, or technical positions in Japan tend to
be overwhelmingly male, which very likely explains
a relatively smaller number of Japanese women in
our sample (p. 397).
Their reference to the airline industry is about generalizing
across industrial contexts.  Their highlighting of the idio-
syncrasy of Japan seems to indicate their concern about the
contextual generalizability of their Japanese case to com-
panies in other countries.  Further studies may be designed to
test the generalizability of their findings along these
directions.
Among the five types of generalization in our classification,
temporal generalization is the most neglected.  Researchers
are usually aware of it when there is some significant struc-
tural change in the context of the original study.  For example,
researchers would hesitate to generalize the results of a study
that investigated the use of IT in factories during the Soviet
Union era to present-day Russia.  However, temporal general-
ization can also be an issue when progressive change is
gradual.  A study of people’s attitudes toward online shopping
conducted 10 years ago is probably outdated as online
shopping has become more popular and secure during the last
10 years.  In brief, IS researchers should pay more attention
to temporal generalization when citing previous studies.
Our classification also helps to clarify the debate about
whether qualitative studies are less generalizable than their
quantitative counterparts.  We agree with Lee and Basker-
ville’s view that within-population generalization (what they
call statistical generalizability) is just one form of gener-
alization and that qualitative research should not be evaluated
based on this form of generalization alone.  The findings of a
case study are surely less generalizable to the population on
which it is based, than the findings of a large-scale random-
sample survey.  But even in this case, the generalizability of
survey results depends a great deal on whether a probability
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sampling method is employed to construct a representative
sample.  Various practical constraints, such as the inability to
include every member of a population in the sampling proce-
dure, often renders probability sampling infeasible in surveys. 
Thus the within-population generalizability of many survey
results is questionable, an important issue that has been
neglected by those who challenge case studies on the grounds
of generalizability.
For the other four types of generalization, there is simply no
reason why survey results should be inherently more gener-
alizable than case study results.  For instance, there is no
justification to believe that case study results are definitely
less generalizable than survey results across populations.  If
the population to which the findings are generalized is in a
very different context and the contextual factors would affect
these findings, the findings of both the case study and the
survey are equally ungeneralizable to that population.
On the other hand, case studies have an edge over quantitative
studies in terms of theoretical generalization.  Case studies
seek to investigate phenomena in their contexts, not indepen-
dently of it (Gibbert et al. 2008), and throw light on the
specific contingent conditions under which the postulated
mechanisms operate to generate the phenomena (Tsoukas
1989).  Such a research process allows researchers to tease
out ever-deepening layers of reality in the search for mech-
anisms and influential contingencies (Harrison and Easton
2004).  The rich description of a case study may lead one to
conjecture a theory that one may then try to falsify by
deducing predictions from it.  It is no wonder that Walton
(1992, p. 129) makes this bold claim:  “case studies are likely
to produce the best theory.” 
Conclusion
We share Lee and Baskerville’s view that generalization is an
important methodological issue and that statistical, sampling-
based generalization is just one type of generalization.  We
also appreciate their attempt to clarify the concept of gener-
alization and to develop a taxonomy of generalizations.  Yet,
their attempt may be improved.  They do not seem to appre-
ciate the drastic fall-out from granting that Hume’s problem
of induction cannot be solved.  We have given Lee and
Baskerville a useful way out of this impasse, by arguing that
we should accept, at least as a working hypothesis, that it has
a solution.
We have clarified the concept of generalization by locating
the major problems in Lee and Baskerville’s article.  A main
reason for these deficiencies is that they have not properly
understood Hume’s problem of induction.  We therefore pro-
vided a deeper discussion of Hume’s problem and presented
a balance-of-evidence argument for the verdict that there is
some justification of induction.  Finally, we proposed a classi-
fication of induction, which will help researchers system-
atically organize the discussion about the generalizability of
their research results.
Generalization is not only an important but also a complicated
methodological issue, deeply embedded in logic, science, and
the essentially argumentative discipline of philosophy.  It is
no wonder that misconceptions abound in the literature.  For
this reason, pioneers like Lee and Baskerville should be
respected for leading the topic into the IS community, despite
their mistakes.  Our essay is just a second step toward eluci-
dating the difficult concept of generalization and classifying
different types of generalization.  It is a topic that deserves
more attention from methodologists, whatever their discipline.
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Appendix A
A Two-Stage Balance-of-Evidence Argument for Using Induction
We will not claim to have solved Hume’s (1975) problem of induction.  Instead we will use a two-stage argument that the balance of evidence
is in favor of the verdict that there is some solution to the problem, even if we do not know what it is.  In stage one, we will show that there
can be no evidence that there is no solution because it is impossible to list in advance all putative solutions.  Next we argue that at a minimum,
there is one solution—and perhaps more—that has some degree of plausibility.  We could establish this by giving a plausible defense of any
of a number of solutions.  A good place to pick one is Chattopadhyaya (1991), who gives an exhaustive treatment of the problem of induction. 
The ones we have picked are Strawson’s (1952) and Reichenbach’s (1938, 1949).  If we have succeeded so far then we may go to the second
stage to conclude that there is more reason to think that there is some successful solution out there than there is reason to think otherwise, even
if we don’t know what solution it is.
To begin the first stage, we have already noted above that Lee and Baskerville (2003) are committed to claiming that Hume’s problem of
induction is “irremediable” (p. 224).  Yet they give us no reason for accepting this serious news.  To show that Hume’s problem of induction
is irremediable—in other words, to give evidence that there is no solution—one would have to first list all the candidate solutions.  Then one
would have to demonstrate that each one fails, ideally winning general acceptance in every case.  This is impossible because there is no way
of knowing whether one’s list is exhaustive.  Who is to say that there is no infinity of distinct putative solutions?  If the list is infinite then one
could not finish it even if one were immortal.  This would be like listing all the prime numbers.  Even if the list is finite, demonstrating that
one has excluded no distinct candidate solution is still impossible, because one cannot say in advance which nonidentical candidates may turn
up to apply.  In this respect, philosophers might say that the list is finite yet indeterminate.  There may well be solutions that nobody has yet
thought of.  Some of these might be successful.  Perhaps there are successful solutions that have been mistakenly written off as failures because
nobody has yet given correct replies to compelling but ultimately misguided objections.  But couldn’t someone argue that Hume’s problem
has no solution by producing a long list of failed solutions? No, because that would be to use induction, by arguing from solutions we have
observed to those we have not! Nothing lies in the scale on this side of the balance of evidence.
Note that we are not expecting anyone to do the impossible.  All we are pointing out is that something is impossible, namely showing that there
is no solution to the problem of induction.  This is not simply because “There are no solutions that are successful solutions” is a universal
negative claim of the form “no A are B.”  Some claims of this form are provable, for example “no integer larger than 10 is an integer less than
5” or “no citizen of Singapore is older than 100.”  But “there is no solution to the problem of induction” is impossible to prove because to prove
it one would have to first list all the candidate-solutions.  As we have argued, this is impossible. 
Any opponent of our claim that there can be no evidence that there is no solution to the problem of induction must show not only why our
reasons for this claim fail, but must also show that there can be evidence that there is no solution of the problem of induction.  The prospects
for any such response look dim.
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Now consider what lies in the scale on the other side of the balance of evidence.  Here the history of philosophy lies before us, with a plethora
of attempts across a variety of traditions to grapple with Hume’s problem.  In the 14th century, Duns Scotus effectively raised the same problem,
to which Kant was a notable respondent.  The first serious respondent to the problem raised in Hume’s tradition was his contemporary, Thomas
Reid.  Modern respondents include Popper, Russell, Black, Nagel, Goodman, Strawson and Reichenbach, as well as postmodernists such as
Derrida and Deleuze (see Chattopadhyaya 1991).
We think that Strawson’s solution is plausible.  He observes that to ask what it means to be justified in our beliefs is to ask what it means to
base them on the evidence available.10  What does evidence mean?  There are two kinds of evidence, deductive and inductive.  To say that a
proposition is supported by deductive evidence is just to say that it can be deduced from propositions that we should accept.  For example, if
we accept the proposition that a given triangle is equiangular, then we are justified in believing the proposition that it is equilateral, because
the latter proposition follows deductively from the former.  Likewise, if we accept the vast body of inductive evidence available—that the law
of gravity has always been observed to operate—then we are justified in believing that it will continue to operate.  To ask whether we are
justified in believing that the law of gravity will continue to operate is to ask whether we are justified in basing this belief on the evidence
available, which, in this case, is inductive evidence.  But basing our belief on evidence is simply what it means to be justified.  To ask whether
we should form beliefs on the basis of inductive evidence is tantamount to asking the trivial question, “Are we justified in being justified?”
Trivially, the answer is yes.  Once this is understood, Hume’s problem is no problem at all.
An objection to this solution is that Strawson has conflated two senses of justified.  One is the sense of justification for believing that induction
is reliable.  The other is the sense of vindication, in other words justification for using induction as a method of making as many true predictions
as possible.  Seen this way, the question whether we should form beliefs on the basis of inductive evidence amounts to the non-trivial question,
“Are we justified in one sense in being justified in another?”
Our reply in defense of Strawson—one we think is original—is that this nontrivial question is either “If we have a good reason to believe that
induction is reliable, then do we have a good reason for using induction as a method of making as many true predictions as possible?” or “If
we have a good reason for using induction as a method of making as many true predictions as possible, then do we have a good reason to believe
that induction is reliable?”  The answer to the first is yes.  The answer to the second is no, but as long as we have guidance for action, we need
not lament the absence of logical proof.  In other words, vindication without justification is better than neither.
In any case, Strawson goes on to vindicate induction.  He observes rightly that no problem arises in the first place because induction is
impossible to vindicate only if we impose deductive standards on it.  But induction by definition is not deduction, so we should not expect
induction to meet deductive standards.  Instead we should judge induction by its own standards.  What justifies the practice of deduction is that
deduction is truth preserving—if you put truth in, you are sure of getting truth out.  What justifies the practice of induction is that induction
is ampliative in the sense that it “can amplify and generalize our experience, broaden and deepen our empirical knowledge” (Vickers 2006);
because we venture into the territory of the unobserved, we may hope to add to our knowledge.  These are complementary virtues, and we
should not expect each type of inference to embody both.  We can’t have our cake and eat it.
A pragmatist might add that we need not vindicate induction to justify its use.  Instead of trying to show that induction is a method of making
as many true predictions as possible, we should look to the expected benefit of choosing to use it.  Such a pragmatist might endorse
Reichenbach’s solution, described and defended by Salmon (1974).  Faced with the need to predict the future, a scientist may use induction
or some rival method such as crystal-ball gazing.  Which should she decide to use?  Either nature is uniform (in the sense that laws of nature,
once true, are always true) or it is not.  If not, then no method of predicting the future will work, including induction and its rivals.  This is
because if the rival method worked—in other words, if it consistently yielded true predictions—then its success would constitute a uniformity
that could be exploited by the inductive method.  For example, we could inductively infer the future success of the crystal-ball gazer from her
past successes.  On the other hand, if nature is uniform, then induction will definitely work, but rival methods, such as crystal-ball gazing, might
or might not work.  “We have, therefore, everything to gain and nothing to lose by using induction.  If induction fails, no other method could
possibly succeed” (Salmon 1974, p. 86).  Faced with a choice between the chance of guidance and the certainty of no guidance at all, the former
choice is the best.  By analogy, before venturing into yet unobserved territory, it is more sensible to use a map that may or may not be reliable
than to throw it away.11
10Strawson uses the term reasonable as a synonym of justified.  Nothing turns upon this.
11This of course is not to construe the choice as between a map which is known to be unreliable and no map at all.  In that scenario, no map might be the better
choice.
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As Chattopadhyaya shows, these are not the only voices in the debate.  For example, it might be argued that Strawson’s view is consistent with
that of Pierce, James, Toulmin, or even Hume himself.  Moreover it would be rare to find a solution to a deep philosophical problem that cannot
be criticized from a variety of perspectives.  Such is the nature of philosophy.  Perhaps we are wrong to conclude that Strawson or Reichenbach
has an adequate solution.  But in that case, we should think of them as illustrations of how two putative solutions—among many others—might
be defended.  They provide at least some evidence that there is some adequate solution out there.
We have shown that it is impossible to demonstrate that there is no solution—because there is no way of identifying all candidate solutions
in advance.  We have also shown that there is a minimum of a single solution that has some degree or other of plausibility.  We may therefore
conclude that there is more reason to think that there is some successful solution out there than there is reason to think otherwise, even if we
don’t know what solution it is.
Appendix B
A Summary of “Generalizing Generalizability in Information Systems Research”
Lee and Baskerville (2003) define generalizability and argue that generalizability need not have a quantitative or statistical dimension. 
However, many IS researchers have just restricted themselves to statistical, sampling-based generalizability and inappropriately applied this
notion of generalizability to nonstatistical, nonsampling forms of research.  The purpose of the article is “to clarify the concept of
generalizability by critically examining its nature, illustrating its use and misuse, and offering a framework for classifying its different forms”
(p. 221).
In section 2, Lee and Baskerville invoke Yin’s (2003) distinction between Level 1 and Level 2 inference in his seminal work Case Study
Research:  Design and Methods, and endorse his argument that statistical generalizability belongs to Level 1 inference whereas inference from
case study findings to theory is Level 2 inference.  Thus statistical generalizability is not an appropriate measure of the quality of case studies.
In their Table 1 (p. 223), they list examples of published studies that inappropriately apply the conception of statistical generalizability to case
research.
In section 3, they examine inductive reasoning, of which statistical generalizing is one form, and focus on Hume’s (1975) problem of induction. 
They commit themselves to the claim that the problem is “irremediable” (p. 224), and thus that statistical generalizability is not justified.  That
is, an increase in sample size will not improve the generalizability of a sample to its population.  Yet they claim that Hume’s problem of
induction imposes “no prohibition of the conclusion that an increase in sample size leads to an increase in the generalizability of one sample
to other samples that the same sampling procedure would produce” (p. 228).
They then examine different conceptions of generalization in positivism and interpretivism in section 4.  A key feature of positivism is its
emphasis on generalization with an aim to discover invariable universal laws, and statistical generalization falls within the domain of positivism. 
In contrast, interpretivism places no particular emphasis on generalization but would not prohibit researchers from extending their theory from
the setting where it was developed to other settings.
They classify generalization into four types in section 5.  They first make a distinction between empirical and theoretical statements, both of
which are made use of in positivist or interpretivist research.  They then classify generalization as empirical statement to empirical statement
(EE), empirical statement to theory (ET), theory to empirical statement (TE), and theory to theory (TT), and elaborate on each.  In particular,
they discuss statistical generalization as Type EE.  They also illustrate their classification with Gefen and Straub’s (1997) article, “Gender
Differences in the Perception and Use of E-Mail:  An Extension to the Technology Acceptance Model,” in section 6.
In the conclusion they reiterate their crucial findings:
(1) In neither case studies nor statistical studies, would it be appropriate to criticize a theory for a lack of generalizability to other settings.
(2) Neither an increase in the sample size in a statistical study nor an increase in the number of sites in a case study would increase the
generalizability of a theory.
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